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Résumé : Le thème de la gouvernance d’entreprise 
s’est  progressivement  imposé  dans  de  nombreux 
domaines  académiques  au  cours  des  quinze 
dernières années. Cet article recense les différentes 
approches  de  ce  concept  en  mettant  en  évidence 
l’influence historique de l’Etat alors que la vision 
traditionnelle  limite  cette  notion  à  la  simple  et 
traditionnelle  relation  entre  dirigeants  et 
actionnaires.  La  crise  financière  récente  montre 
pourtant  que  le  rôle  de  l’Etat  et  celui  de  la 
collectivité en général sont des facteurs clefs dans 
la compréhension de la gouvernance d’entreprise.          
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Abstract: The topic  of corporate governance  has 
become increasingly prominent in recent  years in 
many different academic areas in recent years.  In 
this  article  we  address  various  approaches  to 
corporate  governance,  with  a  particular  emphasis 
on  the  historical  role  of  the  State.  It  seems  that 
certain approaches to corporate governance avoid 
discussing the role of the State, focusing instead on 
interactions  between  corporate  managers  and 
shareholders.  The changes in corporate governance 
which have followed various financial crises show 
that  the  role  of  the  State  and  the  desires  of  the 
larger  society  are  key  factors  in  gaining  a  better 
understanding of corporate governance.  
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The  topic  of  corporate  governance  has  become  increasingly  important  recent  years  in  a 
number of different areas of academic research.  The purpose of this paper is to discuss 
several  different  approaches  to  corporate  governance,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the 
historical and in our opinion, necessary, role of the State in systems of corporate governance. 
Certain theoretical approaches to corporate governance completely avoid discussing the role 
of the State, focusing instead on interactions between corporate managers, boards of directors 
and  shareholders.  The  evolutions  in  the  systems  of  corporate  governance  which  have 
followed  numerous  financial  crises  have  demonstrated  that  the  role  of  the  State  and  the 
desires  of  the  larger  collectivity  are  key  factors  in  understanding  systems  of  corporate 
governance.  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1, discusses the 
complex dialectical tension which exists between the ideas of legitimacy, performance and 
ideology in the discussion of systems of corporate governance.  Section 2, discusses the 
historical and necessary role of the State in systems of corporate governance. It should be 
noted that this paper focuses exclusively on the role of the State with respect to corporate 
governance and it does not discuss the role of corporate lobbying efforts directed towards 
restricting the ability of the State to control corporate activity.  Section 3, presents a summary 
of  the  three  primary  academic  theories  of  corporate  governance  and  relates  these  three 
theories to the three dialectical tensions discussed in Section 1.  Section 4 briefly addresses 
the necessary role of the State in mediating conflicts of interest between theories in periods of 
financial crisis.    
 
 
1.  THE  DIALECTICAL  TENSION  BETWEEN  LEGITIMACY, 
PERFORMANCE AND IDEOLOGY 
 
Despite the financial logic which forms the basis of power and hierarchy in modern business 
enterprises, the rise of “corporate governance” as a major topic of interest during the last 
fifteen or twenty years remains somewhat surprising.  The very idea of governance evokes a 
comparison with a democratic political process in which elected officials seek to form a 
government. In democratic countries, each citizen, except in those cases where there has been 
a suspension of civil rights, has the right to vote. The political connotation that predominates 









































association with the political desire to share in a more or less equal manner the power at the 
heart of a firm. Following this logic, a true electoral process can only proceed in a context 
whereby a certain group, feeling themselves in solidarity with a community of values and 
interests, allows themselves to become subject to a power which they are willing to recognize 
as legitimate (Giddens, 1984). If this constitutional approach strongly taints the idea that we 
now  have  of  our  formal  organizations,  the  mere  existence  of  an  election  does  not 
systematically  result  in  equity  or  justice.  All  forms  of  governance  rest  on  the  idea  of 
“legitimacy”, lacking which the governing authority would not know how to exercise its 
power without considerable resort to force. If the nation-state is clearly the most prominent 
example, and equality of voting which is indifferent to class or wealth, the ideal status, it is 
not generally the mode of operation among the collectivities known as business enterprises.  
It was in order to avoid these hasty parallelisms that the term “governance” quickly came to 
be used as a replacement for the ambiguous term “government” which carries with it certain 
problematic connotations (Charreaux, 2004).   
 
In a general sense, the notion of “legitimacy” can only be conceived of at the level of a 
particular group joined together by a common set of interests and/or destinies (Dogan, 2004). 
With respect to corporate governance, this common set of interests has led to a weighting 
procedure according to the relative sizes of the pecuniary engagements of the participants. If 
the desire for political equality runs counter to this form of weighting procedure, it is in 
financial matters often the rule. Contrary to the presumption of human solidarity, pursuant to 
which a great number of unrelated persons are brought together to advance a given cause, the 
determination of who votes in a corporate general assembly is proportional to the number of 
shares held by each shareholder. It is therefore the financially most committed who weigh 
most on the appointment of directors. This manner by which corporate directors are chosen 
may facilitate the financing of the company. It also may also appear to constitute a way by 
which, in defending their own interests, the greatest contributors of capital enhance the value 
of  the corporation.  Thus,  the “equality  of  treatment”  mandated  by  the  laws  of corporate 
governance does not necessarily correlate with the rights of a “citizen” in a democratic state. 
While companies rarely follow a democratic model, the election of legal representatives to 
control the enterprise produces a type of legitimacy without being necessarily egalitarian 










































Despite this lack of democracy at the heart of the business enterprise, commercial entities 
have long been controlled or supervised by the State through legal structures which specify 
the  operating  parameters  of  companies  to  a  fine  degree  (Braudel,  1985).  These  legal 
mechanisms  have  been  consistently  expanded  and  reinforced  in  response  to  the  risks 
associated  with  the  growth  of  capital  markets  and  more  generally  in  response  to  the 
importance of corporations to the political economy. The modes of election, responsibilities 
and  attributes  of corporate directors are a traditional component  of these laws.  It should 
therefore be noted that if the topic of corporate governance is of relatively recent origin, its 
essence has been present in practical terms since the early 19
th century in the form of laws 
dealing  with  companies  and  commercial  activities  (Pierre,  2002).  Like  the  prose  of  Mr. 
Jourdain in Molière’s “The Bourgeois Gentleman”, corporate governance has existed without 
it being named so.   
 
Any  form  of  conceptualization  proceeds  from  a  desire  to  understand  the  relationships 
between observed phenomena using a process of logical reasoning. Following the inductive 
process which prevails among the social sciences, the logical reasoning process leads to a 
reconsideration of the previous literature dealing with corporate governance. While company 
law has been the subject of multiple studies and commentaries, its progressive adaptation to 
new economic circumstances has provided an abundance of texts which tend to defy overall 
comprehension.  If the technical coherence of the law is hardly in question, few questions 
have been raised about the law’s purpose in operational terms. Company law has therefore 
been  concerned  primarily  with  the  validity  of  various  acts  and  procedures.  The  rise  of 
corporate governance as a topic of interest has been the result of a reawakening regarding the 
distance between the technical features of corporate law and the needs of the general public 
with respect to governance of corporations. It is within the context of financial crises that the 
analysis of corporate governance has been found to be lacking (Baker and Hayes, 2004).   
 
It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  the  recent  increased  awareness  about  the  dysfunctions  of 
corporate governance did not emerge out of crises in continental Europe. Rather, it was in the 
United  Kingdom  that  there  first  appeared,  in  1991,  a  revelation  about  the  questionable 
practices  of  the  press  baron  Robert  Maxwell  (Bower,  1992,  1996).    These  revelations 
produced  evidence  concerning  numerous  questionable  acts;  revelations  which  were 
subsequently added to concerns about the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 









































work of the committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance directed by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury (Cadbury Report, 1992). The recommendations of this committee were focused on 
internal control, the functions of boards of directors, and the role of external auditors.  While 
it can be seen from its title that a large place of honor was granted to financial aspects of 
corporate governance, there was a reinforcement of the argument concerning a need for a 
more critical examination of managerial decision-making. The increasing popularity of issues 
related  to  the  functioning  and  operations  of  capital  markets,  which  began  in  the  1990s, 
undoubtedly  explains  the  quick  transposition  into  various  European  countries  of  a 
questioning  attitude  towards  managerial  decision-making.  The  developments  in  corporate 
governance  accompany  follow  in  an  undeniable  fashion  the  de-regulation  of  financial 
markets and more generally the processes of globalization (Giddens and Hutton, 2000).  
 
In a manner similar to the British efforts to improve the system of corporate governance 
through codes of best practices, in France, the Vienot I (1995) and Vienot II (1999) reports 
focused on establishing the “correct” balance between the role of managing directors and 
other directors. The parallelism between the British and French reports did not end merely 
with recommendations pertaining to a more balanced approach to corporate governance and 
management control. The reports also demonstrated that the recommendations of professional 
management  associations  were  assimilated  into  the  white  papers  issued  by  governmental 
authorities. In other words, even if the responsibilities of directors was at the center of the 
recommendations  that  the committees  put forth, they  did  not  disturb  the  “legitimacy” of 
actual  corporate  governance,  because  there  was  no  objective  other  than  to  reassure 
shareholders their interests were being cared for (Vienot II, 1999).    
 
While  the  parameters  of  corporate  governance  have  been  essentially  circumscribed  by 
managerial  influences  in  many  countries,  the  idea  of  corporate  governance  has  been 
paradoxically conceived of in some different ways in certain continental European countries. 
A remarkable call for research was issued by the French Government through its General 
Planning Commission in March 1999.  This call included a framework which transcended the 
relationship between managers and shareholders. While addressing the differences between 
the interests of large and small shareholders, the document also spoke about “the company, 
its partners and the environment” as well as the “governance of the company and the role of 
employees”.  In  other  words,  far  from  being  narrowly  confined  to  the  interests  of 









































not  simply  a  matter  of  shareholders  and  shareholder  value,  but  also  “stakeholders”  in 
partnership with the company. Consequently, the idea of corporate governance, which was 
initially developed under the British neo-liberal framework, was partially “socialized” during 
its  transposition  into  continental  European  countries.  The  recent  popularity  of  corporate 
governance as a subject undoubtedly therefore explains the opportunism evidenced by many 
academic researchers who have attempted to address governance issues even at the price of 
diluting their original purpose and definition. If law, accountancy and finance constitute the 
most  directly  related  disciplines,  strategy  and  human  resource  management  have  quickly 
followed in the pursuit of academic visibility (Cohen et al., 2002). 
 
While the recent emergence of corporate governance as a topic of concern appears to be in 
many  ways  the  counterparty  to  corporate  failures  and  financial  crises,  it  is  nevertheless 
surprising that the response to these dysfunctions has not been purely and simply defined by 
increased  legislation  in  the  countries  concerned.  Apparently,  there  is  a  dialectical  logic 
guiding the evolution of corporate governance regulations intended to prevent and control 
financial abuses.  The promulgation of “codes of best practices” was the first response to the 
dysfunctions  of  corporate  governance  (Cadbury  Report,  1992;  OECD,  2004).  While  the 
urgency of the financial situation might have ordinarily led to strong intervention by the 
State, it was initially a neo-liberal logic which was pursued. This now seems to be changing 
as the enormity of the crisis is much larger than anyone anticipated.  
 
One can question the efficacy of an approach in which corporations impose constraints upon 
themselves  in  order  to  permit  themselves  to  be  more  transparent  towards  shareholders. 
Nevertheless, if coercion has not been directly imposed by the State, it has been understood 
that the power of the State would be exercised in an indirect manner through social pressures. 
In other words, the diffusion of codes of best practices is a collective requirement sufficiently 
strong  enough  so  that  businesses  align  themselves  in  a  concurrent  manner  in  order  to 
maintain legitimacy. To whatever extent corporate governance practices are “voluntarily” 
applied in accordance with codes of best practices, such practices have become a sort of 
onerous “option” which management is able to “manage”.  The free-form aspects of this 
framework, employing new and somewhat evanescent concepts like the “citizen enterprise”, 
are undoubtedly at the origin of studies which seek to assess the efficacy of the best practices 
approach. It is within this context that a number of researchers have attempted to determine, 









































of business enterprises.  The results of these studies have been less than illuminating. Larker, 
Richardson  and  Tuna  (2004)  concluded  that  the  normal  indicators  of  good  governance 
explain very little about the effects of governance on the behavior of management and the 
performance of corporations concerned. Working with a database provided by Institutional 
Shareholders Services and certain indices of good corporate governance, Brown and Caylor 
(2004) reached conclusions which contradict prior studies regarding the importance of good 
corporate governance.    
 
In fact, few studies of corporate governance focus on the role of the State and the importance 
of  corporate  law.  It  is,  however,  precisely  the  State  and  corporate  law  which  regulate 
relationships between managing directors, supervising boards and the general assembly of 
shareholders.  Schleifer and Vishny (1997) performed a global review of the basic parameters 
of the principal systems of corporate governance in advanced capitalism, but they admitted 
that their study remained at such a level of generality that it revealed little about the specifics 
of the corporate governance mechanisms: “Although a lot has been written about law and 
corporate Governance in the United States, much less is written (in English) about the rest of 
the world, including other wealthy economies. Yet legal rules appear to play a key role in 
corporate governance.” 
 
In effect, disciplinary specialization has led to an incoherent understanding of the role and 
purpose of corporate governance in advanced capitalism. Even if the financial economics 
approach has had its strengths, the conclusions obtained are often trivial due to the nature of 
the questions that are asked. A positive correlation among the variables pertaining to good 
corporate governance and performance variables may demonstrate the usefulness of good 
corporate governance, but the opposite result would equally be a dismaying sign leading to 
harsh questions about the level of rigor of the study.  Consequently, the demand for greater 
transparency  in  corporate  governance  responds  more  to  social  imperatives  than  effective 
performance.  The  cost  of  social  imperatives  is  one  reason  why  nation  states  may  have 
initially  intervened  in  ways  which  allowed  a  relatively  wide  margin  of  freedom  to 
corporations (Baker, 2007).  
 
The  neo-liberal  view  of  corporate  governance  that  is  evident  in  the  empirical  finance 
literature does not take into account the sociological and legal foundations of governance.  









































existing between the evolution of corporate governance and the role of the State. The control 
of managers and the corresponding changes to company law not only facilitate the objective 
of  making  firms  more  transparent  vis-à-vis  shareholders,  they  also  respond  to  social 
requirements for increased legitimacy in the community. No doubt it is this more democratic 
vision  that  has  caused  an  expansion  of  the  idea  of  corporate  governance  to  include  all 
stakeholders of the enterprise. A vision of neo-liberal corporate governance which is anxious 
about  efficiency  and  performance  is  therefore  contrasted  with  a  vision  which  is  more 
“consensual” and provides a more democratic image of the firm (Giddens, 2003).   
 
The enactment of this more democratic vision can lead to confusion in a political sense. 
Effectively, the idea of good corporate governance may be less concerned with improving the 
economic performance of the firm than with exerting control over corporate activity. This 
broadened concept of corporate governance may therefore be seen as a resurgence of an idea 
which was formerly hidden in a world where ideologies were said to have disappeared. In 
effect,  rather  than  governing  relationships  between  managers  and  shareholders,  corporate 
governance is seen as a way to govern corporate behavior, especially whatever behavior is 
considered to be deleterious to the common good. Because the business enterprise is the 
primary  scene  of  conflict  between  capital  and  other  interests  in  society,  questions  about 
corporate governance therefore become central to political thought.   
 
To  summarize  this  section  of  the  paper,  there  are  tensions  between  the  concepts  of 
legitimacy, performance and ideology as illustrated in Figure 1. To explicate the manner in 
which  these  tensions have evolved  through time, in the next section we  will  discuss  the 
historical and necessary role of the State in constructing and facilitating systems of corporate 
governance and mediating between the conflicting concepts of legitimacy, performance and 
ideology. 
 














































2. THE HISTORICAL AND NECESSARY ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
Entities,  the  primary  goal  and  purpose  of  which  is  the  pursuit  of  profit,  have  existed 
throughout human history
1.  Such entities have frequently been created or controlled by the 
State.    Corporations  were  initially  established  as  special  purpose  entities  endowed  with 
certain rights allowing them to exploit profit making opportunities. These enterprises were 
joint-ventures between the company and the State, in which the royal charter specified the 
percentage of profit that would flow to the crown, thus, implicating the State directly in the 
profit making process (Haurere, 2006).   
 
2.1 The Development of Corporate Governance in Europe 
 
The origins of corporate governance in Europe can be traced to Stora Kopparberg in Sweden, 
which obtained a charter from King Magnus Eriksson in 1347, allowing the company to 
exploit certain opportunities in copper mining (2007).  In a similar way, the Dutch East India 
Company  (Vereenigde  Oostindische  Company,  VOC),  was  established  by  the  United 
Provinces in 1602, and it remained during nearly two centuries one of the pillars of Dutch 
capitalism (Morineau, 1999).  In France, a “Declaration of the King establishing a company 
for trade in the Eastern Indies” was promulgated by Louis XIV in 1664.  The statutes of this 
company  included  certain  privileges  such  as  an  exemption  from  taxes,  an  exclusive 
monopoly in trade with the Eastern hemisphere (to which was added in the 18th century, the 
West Coast of Africa), a guarantee of its financial obligations by the royal treasury, and the 
capacity to name ambassadors, to declare war and to conclude treaties.  This company had 
purposes and objectives much broader than its name suggested. It was virtually an arm of the 
French State in that it provided material support for wars against the English and Dutch; it 
contributed to the development of a national navy by affirming the French presence on the 
seas; and it promoted French civilization and the Christian religion (Haudrère, 2006). In other 
words, its purposes were not merely commercial, but also political, cultural and religious. 
 
Beginning in the 17th century, shares in chartered corporations were traded in organized 
capital markets in Amsterdam, London and other cities.  Irrational expectations about the 
value of shares often led to speculation and share price collapse, followed by trading reforms 
                                                
1 See for example, the numerous laws pertaining to business activity contained the Code of Hammurabi dating 









































and increased regulation by the State.
2  Revelations of corporate fraud in some countries led 
to outright prohibitions against any form of corporate activity.  During the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the corporate form was prohibited in most countries, except for the British Empire 
and the United States of America, where the emergent industrial revolution prompted an 
enormous  need  for  capital.    This  demand  for  capital  was  increasingly  provided  through 
organized  capital markets and share exchanges.   The  intersection  of capital and political 
interests led to cycles of corruption and reform, which were exemplified by the Companies 
Acts  in  Great  Britain,  and  the  Commercial  Code  in  France  (Younkins,  2001).    In  each 
instance, there were interventions by the State which sought to control the power and growth 
of  capitalist  enterprises  while  simultaneously  being  enmeshed  in  conflicts  between 
proletarian, bourgeois and aristocratic classes over the ownership and control of industrial, 
financial and commercial enterprises (Cooke, 1950).
3   
 
In  France,  the  Code  du  Commerce  of  1807  allowed  the  creation  of  sociétés  anonymes 
(corporations). While “companies made up of shareholders” had existed in the 18th century, 
they were not widely used. This was, however, the model for companies such as the La 
Compagnie  français  des  Indes  orientales.  Due  to  limitations  on  the  liability  of  the 
shareholders  for  the  acts  of  the  corporation,  the  Code  du  Commerce  subjected  sociétés 
anonymes to regulation by the State.  In contrast, sociétés en commandite par actions, which 
functioned as limited partnerships, were relatively free from regulation because the liability 
of the managing directors was theoretically unlimited and this was thought to constitute a 
guarantee of proper conduct with respect to third-parties (Johnston, 2005). 
 
Braudel  (1985)  has  argued  that  capitalism  can  only  exist  where  the  laws  favor  its 
development.    He  maintained  that  “there  are  positive  social  policies  which  promote  the 
expansion  and  success  of  capitalism”.  These  policies  include  the  maintenance  of  social 
stability  and  the  establishment  of  a  favorable  environment  for  commercial  activity.  The 
existence of a capitalist economy presupposes certain positive acts on the part of the State, in 
that it is only the State which can guarantee the right of private property which is essential to 
capitalist activity.  In France, the right to private property was recognized as an inalienable 
right in the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen enacted by the French State in 
                                                
2 Much like the cycle of de-regulation, speculation, abuse and re-regulation that is taking place today 
3 Gustave Eiffel was both a gifted engineer and an entrepreneur who financed the construction of his tower 









































1789 (Braudel, 1985).  Jean-Baptiste Say advanced this liberal economic logic in his Treatise 
on Political Economy in 1828, in which he enunciated the principle of measuring economic 
value based market exchanges of goods and services.  
 
By way of contrast, political liberals, such as de Tocqueville, were often wary of unbridled 
economic  liberalism.  The  economic  crises  resulting  from  unconstrained  liberal  economic 
policies often forced the State to intervene in economic activity in order to help  workers and 
to protect certain industries
4.  However, it was precisely during the industrial revolution that 
capitalist economies passed from being primarily agricultural to urban and industrial. The 
rural emigration, combined with a demographic explosion, depopulated the country sides and 
filled the large industrial cities with impoverished workers. Various political actors argued 
that only intervention by the State could alleviate poverty and improve working condition 
(Pierre,  2002).  Socialist  thinkers  severely  criticized  the  emergent  capitalism  of  the  19th 
century;  its more radial partisans  sought to  destroy bourgeois society completely. Others 
argued for a more moderate approach which included the formation of trade unions, social 
welfare programs and democratic access to political power. Nevertheless, the period which 
followed the last vestiges of Ancien Régime as incarnated by Louis-Philippe in 1848, and the 
coup  d’état  of  Louis  Napoleon  in  1851,  supported  not  only  industrial,  commercial  and 
banking oligarchies, but also colonial expansion. The commercial treaty of 1860, between 
Great Britain and France liberalized the exchange of agricultural products and manufactured 
goods, and lowered taxes and customs duties. The level of economic liberalism, globalization 
and international trade was greater in the last part of the 19
th century than at any time prior to 
the end of the 20
th century (Pierre, 2002).  
 
Political  turmoil  during  the  20th  century  led  increasingly  to  arguments  regarding  the 
superiority of the socialist system to the capitalist system of economic production.  This 
eventually  led  to  nationalization  of  many  corporations  in  European  countries,  including 
banks, railroads, airlines, telecommunications, electricity, gas, etc.  By the mid 1950s major 
portions of the economies of European countries were controlled directly or indirectly by the 
State, thus the question of corporate governance did not arise, because the State directly 
controlled most enterprises of any significance.  This was not the case in the United States 
                                                









































where  the  State  did  not  own  or  directly  control  business  enterprises,  thus  the  system  of 
corporate governance evolved in quite a different manner. 
 
2.2 The Development of Corporate Governance in the United States 
 
In the early days of the American republic, corporations were individually and specifically 
created through state legislative action.  The chartering of corporations by the states declined 
during  the  19th  century  because  corporate  laws  were  focused  on  protecting  the  public 
interest, and not on the interests of shareholders. Corporate charters were closely regulated by 
state legislatures. Forming a corporation required an act of the legislature. Investors were 
given a voice in corporate governance, and corporations were required to confine themselves 
to the activities specified in their charters. As a consequence, many business enterprises in the 
19th century avoided the corporate form entirely (e.g. Andrew Carnegie created United States 
Steel  as  a  limited  partnership,  and  John  D.  Rockefeller  set  up  Standard  Oil  as  a  trust). 
Eventually, state governments realized that they could profit by providing more permissive 
corporation laws. New Jersey was the first state to adopt a corporate law which had the 
specific purpose of attracting more businesses to incorporate in that state. Delaware soon 
followed and became known as the most corporation-friendly state in the country (Moye, 
2004).  See Table 1 for an outline of the key historical developments in corporate governance 
in the United States. 
 
***Insert Table 1*** 
  
Beyond the corporate law, there was another type of corporate governance in the United 
States which took the form of laws against the formation of interlocking corporate ownership 
(anti-trust), laws against restraints of trade (anti-monopoly), and regulations regarding the 
production  of  food  and  medicine,  as  well  as  price  controls  in  industries  like 
telecommunications, electricity and gas production, water, urban railroads, urban lighting, 
interstate railroads and shipping (Cooke, 1950).  By the mid 1950s, many aspects of the US 
economy were regulated by the federal or state governments through commissions and boards 
which established prices either according to a fixed rate of allowable return on capital or by a 
capping mechanism. This system essentially fell apart in the 1980s, when a worldwide trend 
towards neo-liberalism, fostered in part by the political strategies of Margaret Thatcher in the 









































This  deregulation  trend  continued  through  the  1990s  and  2000s.    Many  of  the  formerly 
regulated  industries  in  the  United  States  (e.g.  banking,  electricity,  airlines,  and 
telecommunications) were deregulated. Many commentators have argued that the process of 
deregulation  has  led  to  the  recent  financial  crises  and  that  a  reconsideration  of  the 
deregulation trend is very much needed. 
 
At  the  same  time  it  must  be  recognized  that  State  intervention  has  often  proven  to  be 
inadequate  to  protect  citizens  and  stakeholders  in  a  globalized  economic  environment. 
Traditional  forms  of  corporate  governance,  largely  dependent  on  ideas  of  shareholder 
democracy  have  been  powerless  to  meet  public  demands  regarding  financial  stability, 
taxation, employment, health and worker safety, product safety, environmental protection, 
anti-trust law, immigration, unfair tariffs, etc., all of which must be addressed by authorities 
of the State charged with governing and controlling corporations. The laws pertaining to 
corporate governance have evolved over the last two hundred years in response to historical 
and economic events, and for the most part these laws have focused on abuses of corporate 
power and fraudulent acts.  Consequently, the corporate law is inadequate to address the 
control  of  corporate  activity  in  an  era  of  globalized  capital  markets  and  transnational 
corporate enterprises. While shareholders may be entitled to certain voting rights by law, the 
laws of corporate governance do not give adequate power to shareholders to control corporate 
activity, unless the shareholders own sufficient shares to dictate their wishes.   
 
Furthermore, the interests of shareholders do not necessarily coincide with the interests of 
other  stakeholders  such  as  creditors,  employees,  customers,  and  society  generally.  
Shareholders would normally like to see increasing share prices, while employees want to 
retain their jobs.  Consequently, there is an inherent conflict among the different stakeholders 
which the laws of corporate governance do not address.  Employment laws are outside of the 
laws  of  corporate  governance.    Likewise,  if  the  majority  of  the  population  of  a  country 
believes that certain types of corporate activity are not desirable (e.g. sale of genetically 
modified crops; arms manufacture; cigarette production; etc.) the laws pertaining to corporate 
governance do not address these issues.  Consequently, while there may be an effort by the 
State to control corporate activities, the laws of corporate governance are not part of this 
control mechanism.  This leads to a social problem in which the objectives and purposes of 
corporate governance are confused.  While the laws of corporate governance concentrate on 









































activity  by  the  State  which  does  not  fall  under  the  definition  of  corporate  governance.  
Moreover, the existing scope of corporate governance is viewed by some members of civil 
society  as  insufficient.    Non-governmental  organizations  argue  for  greater  legislation  to 
govern and control corporate activity.   
 
Thus, it can bee seen that the concept of corporate governance is ambiguous because the laws 
pertaining  to  corporate  governance  often  espouse  a  neo-liberal  orientation  focused  on 
shareholder democracy, while the general laws seek to restrain the ability of corporations to 
pursue profit making activities.  The general laws are derived from democratic processes, but 
equally are the laws pertaining to corporate governance.  Consequently, there is a sort of 
schizophrenia among the citizens of advanced capitalist countries in that the citizens may 
sometimes want market oriented solutions to problems, while at other times they may want to 
place restrictions on what corporations are permitted to do.  Thus, the topic of corporate 
governance is a sort of balancing act among conflicting perspectives relating to legitimacy, 
performance and ideology in which the role of the State becomes increasingly important.   
 
To summarize the discussion of section with respect to the historical and necessary role of the 
State in systems of corporate governance, Figure 2 shows how the laws which seek to govern 
corporations are effectively form  a set  of concentric circles in  which the formal type of 
Corporate Law, which many researchers consider to be the totality of corporate governance, 
is merely one component of the set.  In the next section, we will discuss several theories of 
corporate governance that are prevalent in the academic literature and link these theories back 
to the ideas of legitimacy, performance and ideology. 
 
***Insert Figure 2*** 
 
 
3. CONTRASTING THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
According to Charreaux (2004), the various theories of corporate governance can be divided 
into those which focus on “disciplinary” aspects of governance versus those which focus on 
“cognitive” aspects.  In the disciplinary area there are those which focus on shareholders and 









































3.1 The Shareholder Disciplinary Model 
 
The primary theory of  corporate governance  which underpins most  academic research at 
present, at least in finance, economics and accounting, is the disciplinary shareholder model 
pursuant to which the purpose of corporate governance is to discipline corporate managers so 
that their interests are congruent with those of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This 
model  was  defined  in  the  United  States  by  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976).  The  primary 
assumption  underlying  this  model  is  that  shareholders  are  the  residual  owners  of  the 
enterprise, and as owners, their legal rights are determined by the principles governing the 
possession, use and transfer of private property. The shareholder disciplinary model, and the 
legal  principles  upon  which  it  is  based,  have  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  primary 
responsibility of corporate managers to protect the interests of shareholders.  
 
Research relying on the shareholder disciplinary model has focused on the structure of boards 
of directors, the rights of shareholders, the control of executive compensation, and the audit 
of financial statements in order to prevent embezzlement and fraudulent behavior both on the 
part of managers and employees of the enterprise. It is within this logic that the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act increased legal sanctions for misstatements of financial reports and reinforced the 
independence of both boards of directors and auditors. However, this law did not call into 
question the notion that a good system of corporate governance is one which guarantees the 
interests of the shareholders. In Europe, the concept of corporate governance is more recent 
because its origins  are connected  to the privatization of companies which  were formerly 
owned  or  controlled  directly  by  the  State.  Thus,  the  European  concept  of  corporate 
governance integrates not only the idea of protecting the interests of shareholders, but also 
the manner in which companies are governed by the State. 
 
3.2 The Disciplinary Partnership Model  
 
According to many researchers, the concept of corporate governance should not be limited to 
relationships between managers and shareholders, but rather should take into account the 
range of strategic partners who are the source of value creation in an enterprise (Charreaux, 
2004). These researchers propose a partnership model of corporate governance according to 
which there must be incentives for stakeholders to make investments of their time and money 









































is based on the assumption that a disciplinary partnership model will be more efficient than a 
shareholder model (Zingales, 2000). In other words, the compensation paid to employees and 
other stakeholders will be large enough to motivate stakeholders to increase the economic 
efficiency of  the  enterprise.  In the United States such incentives have taken the  form of 
bonuses and salaries tied to the performance of the enterprise, as well as other incentives such 
as  paid  health  insurance  and  company  funded  retirement  pension  schemes.  Share  option 
grants have also been an important motivational device used in recent years.  The purpose of 
these incentives is to place stakeholders in position which is congruent with the economic 
interests of the enterprise as a whole.  
 
Paradoxically  the  partnership  model  has  been  more  difficult  to  implement  in  European 
countries  because  of  the  existence  of  social  welfare  systems  created  by  the  laws  many 
countries. Companies are mandated by law to provide paid health insurance, company funded 
retirement plans and relatively long vacations, thus foregoing the incentive aspect of such 
incentives.  If  every  employee  receives  the  same  benefits  there  is  no  incentive  to  work 
towards a more efficient mode of operation.  Thus, a partnership model cannot prevent the 
conflicts which often emerge between unsatisfied stakeholders. Ultimately, it is the role of 
the State to act as a mediator to protect the community as a whole. In a period of increasing 
globalisation, recipients of benefits are increasingly not in a position to demand a greater 
share  of the economic results  because the residual shareholders are able  to transfer their 
investments  to  enterprises  producing  a  greater  return  on  investment.  In  this  context,  the 
challenge faced by the State is to govern enterprises in a situation where operations may be 
transferred to countries where labour costs are lower and social protections are weak or non-
existent. 
 
3.3. Socio-cognitive Approaches to Corporate Governance  
 
Some  researchers  have  gone  beyond  the  disciplinary  models  of  corporate  governance, 
whether it be the shareholder or partnership model, in order to describe a model known as 
“socio-cognitive”. This model is derived from idea like increasing the competences of all 
employees through training and reliance on new technologies (Bessiere and Meunier, 2005). 
Pursuant to this approach, protecting the interests of shareholders, or even addressing the 
interests of various stakeholders, are not sufficient to guarantee sustainable value creation.  It 









































investment, with a better coordination of productive capacity, and transferring knowledge 
acquired in order to solve conflicts of interests among recipients of benefits. This is done 
through training, knowledge creation and competence building (Charreaux, 2004). 
 
The notion of sustainable value creation, which underlies socio-cognitive theory, focuses on a 
consideration of the enterprise as a body of knowledge and competencies (Dosi, 1994). A 
sustainable  enterprise  needs  to  be  innovative  and  innovating  (Lazonick  and  O'  Sullivan, 
2000).  In  effect,  three  conditions  permit  the  emergence  of  innovative  enterprises.  These 
include:  industrial  conditions  which  favour  competitive  technologies;  organisational 
strategies which foster cognitive development, and favourable institutional conditions with 
respect  to  labour  legislation,  finance  and  corporate  law.  These  conditions  depend  on 
authorities of the State which are at the origin of the institutions charged with encouraging 
innovation.  According  to  Charreaux  (2004),  the  socio-cognitive  model  of  corporate 
governance, centred on the concept of innovation, leads to a distribution of benefits in a 
manner different from that in the shareholder or partnership models since it privileges those 
who contribute most to new ideas and new processes. It also leads to a re-analysis of the 
structures of corporate governance so as to encourage organisational development. Within 
this logic, the board of directors would include representatives from of all the parts of the 
enterprise  that  are  likely  to  create  value.  Finally,  the  State  would  create  institutions  to 
facilitate  the  process  of  training,  knowledge  creation  and  development.  While  the  socio-
cognitive approach may be intended to lead to innovation and more sustainable companies, it 
does  not  merely  constitute  a  prescriptive  and  normative  theory;  it  can  be  a  pragmatic 
approach  to  corporate  governance  reconciling  the  conflicting  claims  of  legitimacy, 
performance and ideology. 
 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CRISES  
The tensions between legitimacy, performance and ideology are reflected clearly in the three 
theoretical models of corporate governance discussed above (see Figure 1).  In this respect, it 
remains the necessary and important role of the State to mediate between conflicting models 
and conflicting theories of corporate governance.  Moreover, as was discussed previously, 
this mediating role of the State has been present throughout the history of business enterprise.  
Indeed, what now appears to be happening is that the State is reasserting its role with respect 









































current crisis reinforces the need for corporate governance by the State. Given that the risk to 
social stability it is important re-assert the scrutiny and regulation that that has been regularly 
applied by the State. Without a background of social stability the collectively will suffer. The 
question, however, is not how to choose between State control and deregulation, but how to 
identify the points where control is to be appropriately applied, such as in the socio-cognitive 
model (Williams, 2008).  
There is however, a deeper moral issue. Business enterprises are sometimes viewed as if they 
were individuals, with purposes and strategies, deliberating reasonably about how to achieve 
objectives. Business enterprises are in fact social constructions. They are sets of practices, 
habits, and agreements which have arisen through a mixture of choice and chance. This leads 
to errors in understanding the concepts of corporate governance, leading to the idea that 
market forces will eventually lead to the common good and that the market will respond to 
excesses by a through a sort of equilibrium process. The concept of best practices leads to the 
idea of exhorting business enterprises to acquire public responsibility and moral vision. This 
idea loses sight of the fact that the market is not an individual consciousness, but rather that is 
an  aggregation  of  activities  carried  on  by  persons  who  make  decisions  about  priorities.  
Business enterprises are not philanthropic; seeking a profit is a sanctioned activity. It is also 
true that reducing regulation and surveillance by the State in order to allow entrepreneurs and 
innovators to create wealth is necessary in order to draw whole populations out of poverty. 
However, it is simplistic to say that the neo-liberal view of corporate governance will secure 
stable and just outcomes everywhere. Thus, the historical and necessary role of the State in 
the system of corporate governance is to assure stability and to enhance the probability of just 




In this article we have addressed the issue whether corporate governance is primarily a matter 
of “legitimacy”, that is, the legitimacy of the business enterprise from a legal perspective, but 
also  the  legitimacy  of  the  State  which  seeks  to  control  transnational  corporations  in  an 
increasingly  globalized  environment  (a  democratic  perspective).    Alternatively,  corporate 
governance  may  be  considered  from  the  perspective  of  corporate  finance  and  financial 









































face  of  increasingly  competitive  capital  markets  (a  neo-liberal  perspective).    Finally, 
corporate  governance  may  be  seen  to  be  primarily  a  matter  of “ideology”,  in  which  the 
perception of good governance pursuant to codes of best practices masks a more problematic 
set of underlying political issues (a critical perspective).  We have investigated these three 
perspectives through an analysis of the historical and necessary role of the State in promoting 
an  effective  system  of  corporate  governance  both  from  an  ideological  and  a  legitimacy 
perspective.  In essence, the role of the State is to reconcile conflicting perspectives in order 
to promote an effective system of corporate governance.  While the advocates of financial 
economics  argue  that  the  role  of  corporate  governance  should  be  focused  solely  on 
performance, it appears that this is actually less important in terms of the role of the State 
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Table 1 : Key Points in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in the United States 
 
1632-  Massachusetts Bay Company is chartered by King Charles I. 
1732-  New London Society for Trade and Commerce in Connecticut was the first 
profit-seeking corporation organized under a state legislative charter. 
1811-   New York passed the first law allowing incorporation of manufacturing 
companies. 
1819-  United States Supreme Court in Dartmouth v. Woodward that a corporation is 
an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in the contemplation 
of the law, thus restricting the right to form corporations to the legislatures.   
1830-   New Jersey granted a monopoly to the Camden and Amboy Railroad 
Company to provide railroads in certain areas. 
1830-1880- Corporations in most states could only be formed by law passed by the state 
legislature and only for a specific purpose. 
1886-  In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad defined corporations as 
"persons" with legal rights. 
1888-  New Jersey Holding Company act allowed corporations to acquire other 
companies. 
1889-  New York brings anti-trust actions against the Sugar Trust.  
1890-  The Federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act allowed the federal government to break 
up trusts. 
1892-  New Jersey Corporation Trust Company was formed to create hundreds of 
other corporations.  This allowed holding companies to exist despite the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and established legal rights of corporations. 
1899-  Delaware enacts laws favoring corporations and establishing legal rights 
similar to those of New Jersey. By the 1920s, Delaware won the “race to the 
bottom” in favor of corporations.  
1911-  Federal government breaks up the Standard Oil Trust. 
1933-  US Federal Securities Act of 1933 requires registration of securities that are 
traded in public stock markets. 
1934-  US Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 causes the creation of the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and requires annual audited financial 
statements to be issued to shareholders.  Audits must be made by independent 
accountants (i.e. Certified Public Accountants). 
1938-  Creation of the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.   CAP is designated by the SEC as 
the accounting standards setting body for the United States. 
1959-  The AICPA creates the Accounting Principles Board (APB) to replace the 
CAP as the accounting standards setter for the US. 
1973-  The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is created to replace the 
APB as the accounting standards setter for the US. 
2002-  Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a majority of independent directors and 
appointment of the auditor by an audit committee of the board consisting 
solely of independent directors.  Prior to this law, there was no legal 
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Employment and Labour Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Law 
 
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
4
5
9
3
7
7
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
3
 
F
e
b
 
2
0
1
0